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STUDENT NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-OBTAINING DUE
PROCESS IN PUBLIC UTILITY PRE-
TERMINATION PROCEDURES
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 25, 1973, an elderly couple was found in their
home in Schenectady, New York, apparently frozen to death as a
result of having their heat disconnected by the utility company.
The couple had received notices that their bill was overdue but had
not paid it, so the company discontinued service during a severe
northern winter. Ironically, more than enough money was found in
the house to cover the utility bill, but, apparently, no effort was
made by the utility company either to contact the elderly couple
personally or to determine their reasons for nonpayment. Those
reasons will probably never be known.'
This incident is probably the most dramatic illustration to
date of the need for procedural due process guarantees prior to the
termination of utility services. Few cases, and still fewer
commentators, have, as yet, even considered this issue. This note
will (1) analyze the existing case law dealing with the furnishing
of procedural due process by a public utility to its customers; (2)
explore the inadequacies of the case by case approach as a solution
to the due process problem; and (3) examine the West Virginia law
relating to public utilities to determine whether West Virginia util-
ities can be required to furnish procedural due process to their
customers.
HI. PUBLIC UTILITIES AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS-THE ExISTINGr
CASE LAW
All the cases in which a plaintiff has contended that a public
utility's termination of service was without due process have been
brought under title forty-two, section 1983 of the United States
Code2 and its corresponding jurisdictional statute, title twenty-
'N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1973, at 25, col. 1.
242 U.S.C. § 1983 (1971):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
1
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eight, section 1343(3) .3 The plaintiff must affirmatively prove two
elements in order to maintain an action under section 1983: (1)
That the defendant has deprived him of a right secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States; and (2) that the defen-
dant deprived him of this right under color of a statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any state or territory.4 The first of
these elements is often referred to as the "rights or entitlements"
requirement and the second as the "state action" or "under color
of state law" requirement.' These are the initial questions with
which a court must deal prior to deciding whether, in a particular
case, the plaintiff has been deprived of due process. These two
issues are also a categorically convenient way to examine the exist-
ing cases in the area of due process as applied to public utilities.
A. The Rights or Entitlements Element
The courts that have considered this issue have, in general,
had little difficulty finding that public utility service is a constitu-
tionally protectable interest.' It was not until recently, however,
that such a conclusion could have been so easily reached. Tradi-
tionally, property protected by the due process clause was only
that in which individuals had possessory or statutorily granted
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
328 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1971):
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, stat-
ute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or
immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act
of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States ....
'Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1969).
'It should be noted at this point that the theory in the public utility cases is
that if utility service is the type of property contemplated by the due process clause
of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, then it is protected by
the "right" of due process.
GE.g., Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Stanford v. Gas Service Co., 346 F. Supp. 717 (D. Kan. 1972); Palmer v. Columbia
Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972), afl'd, 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973);
Davis v. Weir, 328 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
2
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interests.7 In Goldberg v. Kelly," the traditional rule was extended
to include "statutory entitlements," i.e., welfare payments. A fur-
ther extension of the rule in the public utility cases9 has generally
been grounded on reasoning similar to that found in Stanford v.
Gas Service Co.:
[Wihatever the classification of utility services, be they rights,
privileges, or entitlements, such life-sustaining services would
seem to fall within the same constitutional protections afforded
welfare benefits, wages, drivers' licenses, reputation in the com-
munity, and possession of personal property, all as has been
previously decided by the United States Supreme Court.'
This reasoning reflected the feeling of the court that the type of
services provided by utilities was far more important to the welfare
of the individual than some of the property interests which the
United States Supreme Court had previously found to be constitu-
tionally protected."
Although it seems clear that public utility service is a "right
or entitlement" which is constitutionally protected, until recently
there existed another possible barrier to litigating the applicability
of the due process clause to public utilities via section 1983. It was
long believed that only personal rights-not property rights-were
protected by section 1983.12 However, in Lynch v. Household Fi-
nance Corp., the United States Supreme Court held that property
7Note, Constitutional Safeguards for Public Utility Customers: Power to the
People, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 493, 512 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional
Safeguards].
'397 U.S. 254 (1970).
'While in a sense these cases might be viewed as an extension of
Goldberg, their conclusions are soundly based. The right to utility service
is not technically granted by statute or license, so Goldberg might be
distinguished on this ground. Yet the state statutes require utilities to
serve all who apply, and evince a strong interest in assuring that utility
service is provided fairly. Thus it can be argued that the state has con-
ferred a benefit upon the public, denial of which requires due process.
Constitutional Safeguards, supra note 7, at 512.
10346 F. Supp. 717, 721 (D. Kan. 1972) (citations omitted). See also cases
collected supra note 6.
"The court, in Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241, 244 (N.D. Ohio
1972), affd, 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973), stated:
[Tihe consequences of shutting off gas service inflicts hardships upon
the consumer that far transcend the loss of driving privileges, Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), delay in paying unemployment compensa-
tion, California Dep't of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121
(1971) . . . or even the denial of direct relief payments, Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 263 (1970). . ..
2See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
[Vol. 76
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rights were within the scope of section 1983.13 In Ihrke v. Northern
States Power Co., the circuit court of appeals reversed the lower
court's ruling that a property right in public utility service was not
cognizable in a section 1983 civil rights action and cited Lynch as
authority for so doing. " There is, thus, little doubt, in view of these
authorities, that public utility service is a constitutionally pro-
tected right or entitlement and that one can seek to protect this
right under section 1983.
B. The "State Action" Element
The more difficult question in the public utility cases is
whether public utilities are "state actors," or in section 1983 lan-
guage, whether they act "under color of state law."'" Although the
United States Supreme Court has never directly dealt with the
issue of public utilities as state actors," three theories of state
action enunciated by the Court can be applied in the utility cases.
These theories can be characterized as (1) the governmental regu-
lation theory; 7 (2) the public function theory; 18 and (3) the agent
13405 U.S. 538 (1972). This holding is significant, particularly in public utility
cases where the amounts of money involved are normally small and, thus, the
jurisdictional amount requirements found in other federal statutes are difficult to
meet.
"459 F.2d 566, 568 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972).
"Some courts appear to have predicated a finding of state action on the gross-
ness of the utility's abuse of minimum procedural fairness. Compare Palmer v.
Columbia Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd, 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir.
1973), where the court felt the attitude of the utility was "shockingly callous," with
Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co.,466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1114 (1973), where the court apparently felt that the utility's procedures
were fair. This kind of judicial reasoning can, however, lead only to confusion since
the determination of whether a utility is a state actor should be independent of and
not predicated on the nature of the due process violation in question.
"It is probably more correct to say that the United States Supreme Court has
never held a utility a state actor for purposes of applying the fourteenth amendment
due process clause, since the Court did hold, in Public Utility Comm'n v. Pollak,
343 U.S. 451 (1952), that a utility was a state actor for the purposes of applying
the first and fifth amendments.
"American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (private entities closely regulated by the state are
state actors).
"Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308 (1968); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S.
461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (private entities which have
significant control over the operation, management, or supply of a governmental
or public service are state actors for the purpose of § 1983).
4
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or joint participant theory. 9 These theories are overlapping, rather
than distinct, and they all can have some applicability in public
utility cases. 0 Therefore, this note will not attempt to categorize
the cases on the basis of these theories, nor will it specifically
analyze which theories may apply to an individual case.2' It will,
however, isolate the factors which some courts have felt determina-
tive in finding that public utilities are state actors and, in so doing,
attempt to define a "state action" standard which can be applied
to all public utilities.
1. The Monopoly Factor
Many of the courts which have found that public utilities are
state actors have considered significant the fact that utilities are
granted exclusive franchises by the states or their subordinate
branches; that is, utilities are monoplies.Y The natural conse-
quence of a monopoly is to eliminate the consumer's ability to
obtain alternative utility services. As the court in Ihrke v. North-
ern States Power Co. stated:
By its own actions, the City of St. Paul has in effect given
Northern a monopoly on the retail distribution of gas and elec-
tricity, and as a practical matter, the Ihrkes could not buy these
commodities from any other source. Under these circumstances,
we think it is abundantly clear that the action of Northern in
threatening to terminate the service to the Ihrkes was under
'color of law' as used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . .
The insulation from competition received by a utility-although
certainly not without reason-can be a powerful weapon in the
hands of a utility bent on taking advantage of the powerless con-
sumer. 4 Most importantly, it is an advantage given the utility by
the state. Thus, although the utilities will argue vehemently that
"Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (an individual acting as an agent of the state
does so under color of state law).
2mSee Constitutional Safeguards, supra note 7, at 501.
2 For an excellent analysis of these theories, see Constitutional Safeguards,
supra note 7, at 500-11.
'Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated as
moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972); Stanford v. Gas Service Co., 346 F. Supp. 717 (D. Kan.
1972); Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd, 479
F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973).
2459 F.2d 566, 570 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972).
2See Constitutional Safeguards, supra note 7, at 493 & n.4.
[Vol. 76
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the fact that they are monopolies is not alone sufficient to support
a finding that they are state actors, the same utilities seek shelter
as "state actors" when they are threatened with an antitrust viola-
tion. "n The courts have agreed with the contentions of the utilities
and have exempted them from the antitrust laws as "state actors"
when their "practices were at all times within the ambit of regula-
tion of and under the control of SCC [Virginia's State Corporation
Commission] ."26
Therefore, several important factors relating to state action
exist as a result of a utility's monopoly status: (1) The utility is
free from competition because the state allows it to be; (2) the
consumer is deprived of other sources of utility services allowing,
in some instances, for high-handed treatment of the customer;2 7
and (3) the utilities have sought and received exemption from the
antitrust laws as state actors. These would appear to be strong
reasons for finding that any utility operating as a monopoly or
having an exclusive franchise is a state actor. However, most
courts have considered monopoly status alone inadequate and
have, therefore, applied another factor in finding state action-the
amount and type of state regulation involved in the utility's activi-
ties.
2. The Regulation Factor
The extent to which a utility is subject to regulation by the
state2 is probably, in most cases, determinative of the question of
nSee Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248
(4th Cir. 1971).21 d. at 252.
2
'For an example of the nightmarish situations which some utility customers
have faced, see Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) and Comment, 6 CREIGHTON L. Rav. 417 (1973).
2The following are some of the considerations to which the courts have looked
to determine the nature of the regulation involved:
[W]hether 1) the entity is subject to close regulation by a statutorily-
created body . . .2) the regulations filed with the regulatory body are
required to be filed as a condition of the entity's operation, 3) the regula-
tions must be approved by the regulatory body to be effective, 4) the
entity is given a total or partial monopoly by the regulatory body, 5) the
regulatory body controls the rates charged and/or specific services offered
by the entity, 6) the actions of the entity are subject to review by the
regulatory body, and 7) the regulation permits the entity to perform acts
which it may not otherwise perform without violating state law.
Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 407 F.2d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 1969) (concurring opin-
ion), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846 (1969).
6
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state action. In fact, this element accounts for the split between
the decisions in cases which have found state action and those
which have not. This split probably results from the application
of two different doctrines to the utility cases. The cases finding
state action have generally relied on the theory of Evans v.
Newton: "Conduct that is formally 'private' may become so en-
twined with governmental policies or impregnated with a govern-
mental character as to become subject to the constitutional limita-
tions placed on state action."2 On the other hand, the cases not
finding state action appear to have applied the rationale of Moose
Lodge v. Irvis.3 0 Moose Lodge announced a more restrictive stan-
dard to be used in determining state action.-' The Court held that
the general scheme of regulating liquor clubs in Pennsylvania was
insufficient state involvement to justify a finding that the clubs,
as a result of being regulated, had become state actors."
Two cases illustrate the different application of these theo-
ries. "- In Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., the court assumed
that the power company was "pervasively" regulated by the Wis-
consin Public Service Commission.34 The court refused, however,
to hold the utility company a state actor because it was unable to
find that the state had affirmatively supported the utility in its
termination procedures.3 5 The court cited Moose Lodge and noted
that the United States Supreme Court had expressly rejected the
argument that the state's granting of a liquor license fostered the
racial discrimination complained of in that case .3 The court's deci-
sion is perplexing because it noted, but dismissed, the argument
that the state affirmatively supports the utility by granting it a
-382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
-'407 U.S. 163 (1972).
31The court apparently rejected the argument that a regulatory scheme makes
a private individual a joint participant with the state and the theory that govern-
mental regulation can, by itself, be state action. Constitutional Safeguards, supra
note 7, at 503.
32407 U.S. at 175-77.
3For a decision which considers the applicability of both theories to public
utilities and adopts the Evans v. Newton position, see Hattell v. Public Service Co.,
350 F. Supp. 240 (D. Colo. 1972).
-466 F.2d 638, 641 n.5 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973). The
regulations set forth in that footnote made it clear that the company was, in fact,
extensively regulated.
The Power Commission had, however, approved the termination procedures
which the utility company used. Id. at 642.
3 Id. at 655 n.37.
[Vol. 76
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monopoly. This support is related to the termination procedures
because it results in the customer being denied an alternative
source of supply." It is unfortunate that the court failed to see this
relationship because termination procedures are directly related to
sources of supply, in that regulation of a utility's activities is to
protect the public which has nowhere else to turn to procure such
vital services.3 Termination procedures are obviously related to
the utility's monopoly status, and failure to apply due process
standards to those procedures is not in the public interest.
In opposition to the conclusion reached in Lucas is Stanford
v. Gas Service Co.,"' in which the court relied on the Evans v.
Newton concept in finding state action. The Kansas statute under
consideration in Stanford authorized the Kansas Corporation
Commission to "supervise and control the public utilities" and to
"do all things necessary and convenient for the exercise of such
power, authority and jurisdiction."40 In holding this authorization
sufficient to support a finding of state action the court said:
The defendant Company is an included public utility ir this
extremely broad grant of authority and due to such extreme
3TAlthough the United States Supreme Court did not base its decision in Moose
Lodge entirely on alternative sources of supply, it dia point out that such sources
were available and that, although the number of liquor licenses was limited, the
private club business was far from a monopoly. 407 U.S. at 177. One can also
distinguish the nature of the regulation in Moose Lodge from that in the public
utility cases. It is apparent that liquor clubs are regulated because there is some
feeling that they are not really in the public interest; on the other hand, utilities
are regulated to insure that they operate in the public interest. Finally, the nature
of the property involved is entirely different. Most view liquor as a non-essential
item, while it has been previously noted that utility service has been viewed by the
courts as essential to life. Such a case is discussed in note 11 supra. This distinction
is valid even though the plaintiff in Moose Lodge was seeking to protect a personal
right, i.e., the freedom from racial discrimination, because the Court may very well
have viewed this right in connection with the nature of the service which the
plaintiff was seeking to obtain.
31One can speculate that the reasoning in Lucas is a result of the court's desire
to be consistent with its earlier decisions which refused to find that utilities were
state actors. Particular Cleaners, Inc. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 457 F.2d 189
(7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 890 (1972); Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co.,
407 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846 (1969). Additionally, the
court in Lucas had apparently made up its mind that due process had been satisfied
prior to making its decision on the issue of state action. See 466 F.2d at 641-45.
1346 F. Supp. 717 (D. Kan. 1972).
"°KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-101 (1972). It is interesting to note that this statute is
much broader and, if anything, less "pervasive" than the regulations considered in
Lucas.
8
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regulation, has tended to lose its "private character." It and a
very few other corporations or business enterprises in privately
owned public utility businesses, do in fact enjoy a complete
monopoly of supplying an essential commodity to the citizens
of this and other states. . . Such public utilities, beyond
question, perform public functions in the public interest under
public regulation. As such, they are subject to constitutional
restraint.'
The court, in this statement, reached the very essence of the
issue. The existence of procedural fairness in the dealings of large
utilities with their customers cannot be dependent on a narrow
distinction as to whether the activity in question is affirmatively
supported by the state. Rather, by granting utilities monopoly
status, the states have, in effect, brought all their activities,
whether directly regulated or not, under the umbrella of constitu-
tional scrutiny. Thus, regulation which admittedly applies to other
industries, coupled with monopoly status which most others do not
have, places the utility in the position of being exactly what its
name implies-"public." As such, it is a state actor and should be
required to provide standards of procedural fairness in dealing with
its customers.
III. INADEQUACIES OF THE CASE BY CASE APPROACH
Thus far, it is clear that public utilities can and should be
considered state actors. Given this premise, it is appropriate to
examine whether the application of due process standards to pub-
lic utilities can best be accomplished in the judicial forum. There
are strong arguments that the problem could be better dealt with
either administratively or legislatively so long as the legislature or
administrative agency feels that utility customers should be able
to avail themselves of greater procedural safeguards.
A. Reasons for the Inadequacies of the Judicial Approach
The first reason for suggesting that the judicial method is
inadequate is that cases involving state action are decided on an
individual basis according to their facts.2 As suggested earlier,
there would appear to be applicable standards under which all, or
nearly all, public utilities could be considered state actors. How-
ever, it is also clear that for various reasons some courts have been
1'346 F. Supp. at 722.
"See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
[Vol. 76
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reluctant to so hold.43 Thus, the initial problem with the judicial
approach in utility cases is the varying application of different
standards to utilities in different regions of the country. Inherent
in this problem is an additional dilemma. Namely, various utilities
can be considered "state actors" only after they have been individ-
ually challenged and their cases have been resolved in the courts.
As a result, some utilities within a state might be required to
furnish procedural safeguards to their customers while others
might not. Finally, the judicial process of applying state action
standards to all the utilities within a state (let alone all the utilities
in the United States) would be extremely time consuming.
Second, because of the very nature of a public utility case,
litigation is impractical. In many instances, the amount of money
involved is small.44 Therefore, litigation is often impractical unless
the plaintiff can bring his case as a class action. Additionally, the
greatest harm to the plaintiff results from the loss of his essential
utility services for some period of time until an action can be
initiated or agreement can be reached with the utility. Thus, al-
though the plaintiff may have a judicial remedy, he needs proce-
dural protection prior to the time utility services are terminated.
One of the best examples of the need for more effective pre-
termination procedures occurred in Bronson v. Consolidated Edi-
son Co.4" The court described the situation in Bronson as "an Or-
wellian nightmare of computer control .... "46 Mrs. Bronson
began receiving electric bills several times higher than those she
was accustomed to paying. She paid only her normal bill, and
"See supra note 38 for some of the cases which found no state action.
"The amount involved in Lucas was $9.89. Furthermore, many of the plaintiffs
involved in public utility cases are welfare recipients. See Bronson v. Consolidated
Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Hattell v. Public Serv. Co., 350 F.
Supp. 240 (D. Col. 1972).
11350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Another example is Palmer v. Columbia
Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd, 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973). In
Palmer, the defendant utility company sent out 120,000-140,000 shut-off notices
annually, of which only about four percent were actually ever acted upon. The
meters were read infrequently and computer-estimated billings were inevitably
lower than actual readings, thus considerably increasing the amount owed when
actual readings became available. Notices allowed four days for payment, and no
actual notice was given when the shut-off was made. In fact, the metermen did not
even notify the customers that they were on the property to disconnect the gas lines.
The court said: "The evidence as a whole revealed a rather shockingly callous and
impersonal attitude upon the part of the defendant . "Id. at 243.
11350 F. Supp. at 444.
10
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attempted through inquiry to correct the discrepancy. After an
investigation of sorts by the defendant, it was discovered that Mrs.
Bronson's landlord had been diverting current through her meter.
In spite of this finding, the defendant continued to bill her at the
higher rate and finally shut off her electricity. After three weeks
without electricity, Mrs. Bronson obtained an emergency check for
$147.81 from the Department of Social Services from which she
received welfare assistance. This should have covered the amount
the defendant insisted that she owed, but subsequent bills kept
demanding her "arrears" payment. Finally, she was again threat-
ened with disconnection when two of the defendant's representa-
tives visited her home and demanded an arrears payment of
$175.00.1 7
The Bronson case illustrates the need for effective pre-
termination procedures in utility cases. The fact that Mrs. Bron-
son was successful in resolving her dispute with the utility com-
pany through the judicial process is probably of very little comfort
to her when she remembers the three weeks she spent without
electrical service. The most effective way to prevent recurrences of
the Bronson case or the situation involving the elderly couple from
Schenectady mentioned at the beginning of this note would be to
enlarge the already substantial powers of the regulatory commis-
sions that control utilities to include procedural safeguards. In this
manner, all utilities within a state could be effectively required to
furnish adequate termination procedures and other safeguards to
their customers. Additionally, the utility commissions could effec-
tively supervise the implementation and use of these procedures.
They could also ameliorate the additional cost of such procedures
by slight adjustments in the utility rates which, in most states, are
under their control. Thus, legislative or administrative implemen-
tation of due process standards would be more effective than any
attempt to apply these standards through the judicial process.
B. The Due Process Standard
The next logical question to consider is what due process stan-
dards, regardless of how implemented, should a public utility be
required to meet? The fundamental requirements of procedural
TThe defendant's explanation of what happened to Mrs. Bronson's check for
$147.81 is quite interesting. Defendant asserted that: "(1) [Ihe check was lost at
the bank; (2) 'the bank notified the company that they had not received the check';
and (3) the company, 'by an unknown employee,' then reentered the $147.80 deficit
on Mrs. Bronson's account." Id. at 4,45.
[Vol. 76
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fairness are notice and the opportunity to be heard prior to being
deprived of some constitutionally protected personal or property
right,'0 but these requirements are not absolute. For example, a
hearing may be dispensed with if the government's interest in
summary adjudication substantially outweighs the deprivation
facing the plaintiff.1' However, the Bronson court was not pur-
suaded by the defendant's argument that its interests-potential
cash flow decrease, greater administrative burdens, and added
expenses-substantially outweighed those of the plaintiff."0 Thus,
prior notice and hearing should be required in the normal utility
cases, but it is uncertain exactly what form such notice or hearing
must take. Due process requires only that which is fundamentally
fair to the individual under the circumstances." Clearly, the notice
must apprise the customer of the amount owed, the consequences
of nonpayment or delay in payment, and the availability of any
dispute-solving mechanisms. 5 2 To insure receipt of the notice, it
should be sent by registered mail and probably followed up with a
"'Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969).
"Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits). In
Goldberg the Court made it clear that "the interest of the eligible recipient in
uninterrupted receipt of public assistance, coupled with the State's interest that
his payments not be erroneously terminated, clearly outweighs the State's compet-
ing concern to prevent any increase in its fiscal and administrative burdens." Id.
at 266. Similar reasoning applied in utility cases would seem to effectively eliminate
a utility's argument that additional procedures would prohibitively increase expen-
ses. This argument should carry relatively little weight in any case because, as
previously noted, utilities could receive slight rate increases to compensate for their
additional administrative expense.
1350 F. Supp. at 448.
"
tMullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). The
Bronson court concluded, after examining the "informal" procedures available be-
fore either the utility or the Public Service Commission, that no determination as
to fundamental fairness could be made on "the present state of the record." 350 F.
Supp. at 450.
"Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). The notice in Bronson said simply:
TURN-OFF NOTICE-WE ARE SORRY, BUT YOUR SERVICE WILL
BE DISCONTINUED UNLESS THE TOTAL AMOUNT SHOWN
BELOW IS PAID BY MAR 02 1970.
Although the court could not prescribe what notice of the available remedies should
have been given since it could not determine whether the existing hearing proce-
dures were adequate, it did state: "Con Ed has not undertaken in any way to advise
the customer of the recourses allegedly available to him or her. . . .Thus, whatever
form of hearing is ultimately determined appropriate in this case, it is clear now
that customers such as Mrs. Bronson are entitled to more adequate notice." 350 F.
Supp. at 450.
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phone call.:Y Some actual and personal notice should also be given
to the customer when the utilities are disconnected." Furthermore,
in situations where landlords and tenants are involved, both
should receive the appropriate notice." Finally, sufficient time
must be given to allow the customer either to pay his bill or initiate
any action to contest the amount in question."6
Prescribing the essentials of a fair hearing is more difficult."'
Initially, the customer should be able to attempt to settle the
dispute in an informal hearing with the company. Such a hearing
should be prompt, stay any pending termination, and be without
special charge to the customer. If dissatisfied with the company's
resolution of the problem, the customer should be allowed an ap-
peal to the public utility commission consisting of a hearing, which
meets the general qualifications described above, before an impar-
tial hearing examiner. If the commission's findings are adverse to
the customer, the utility could then terminate service, and the
customer would still be free to utilize any judicial remedies avail-
able to him. Providing this kind of notice and hearing to the cus-
tomer would surely cost the utility very little in comparison to the
consequences of wrongful termination of utility service.
IV. WEST VIRGINIA PUBLIC UTILITIES AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The final topic to be considered in this note is West Virginia
public utility law. More precisely, this section will examine the
regulatory powers of the West Virginia Public Service Commission
[hereinafter referred to as the Commission] and attempt to deter-
mine if its powers are similar to those of the commissions in the
states where public utilities have been found by the courts to be
state actors. Finally, this section will discuss the possibility of the
imposition of due process standards by the Commission in light of
its present regulatory powers.
The West Virginia Public Service Commission is authorized
to regulate all "public utilities."'" The West Virginia Supreme
5'Constitutional Safeguards, supra note 7, at 518.
-"A procedure such as this would remedy the situation found in Palmer v.
Columbia Gas Co., which is described in note 45 supra.
-"See Davis v. Weir, 328 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
"Constitutional Safeguards, supra note 7, at 518-19.
51See supra notes 51 & 52 for an example of the difficulty the Bronson court
had in prescribing the essentials of a fair hearing.
"A "public utility" is defined as: "any person or persons, or association of
(Vol. 76
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Court of Appeals has said that the distinguishing characteristic of
a public utility is "the devotion of private property by the owner
or person in control thereof to such a use that the public generally
: . * has the right to demand that the use or service, as long as it
is continued, shall be conducted with reasonable efficiency and
under proper charges."'' The purpose of the Commission, in regu-
lating utilities, "is to require such entities to perform in a manner
designed to safeguard the interest of the public and the utilities." 60
In this connection, the Commission is given the power to: (1) Regu-
late all rates, methods and practices of public utilities; (2) require
copies of all reports, rates, classifications and timetables in effect
and used by utilities; (3) require utilities to conform to all rules,
regulations, and orders of the Commission; (4) compel obedience
to lawful orders by mandamus or injunction; (5) change any rate
or toll which is unjust and prescribe rates or tolls which are just
and reasonable; and (6) prohibit any practice which shows undue
favoritism or discrimination. " In addition, the Commission has the
power to inspect the property and equipment of a utility, 2 estab-
lish a system of accounts to be kept by utilities,3 and require a
"certificate of public convenience and necessity" prior to the time
a utility begins operation or expands an existing facility or serv-
ice. " Furthermore, there are many transactions, such as sale of
franchises and merger, into which a utility cannot enter without
the prior approval of the Commission. 5 Finally, all public utilities
pay a special license fee to the Public Service Commission in order
to provide revenue for operating expenses.6
persons, however associated, whether incorporated or not, including municipalities,
engaged in any business, whether herein enumerated or not, which is, or shall
hereafter be held to be, a public service." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 24-1-1 (1971 Replace-
ment Volume).
"Boggs v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 154 W. Va. 146, 151-52, 174 S.E.2d 331, 335
(1970).
wId. at 154, 174 S.E.2d at 336.
"
1W. VA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-2 (1971 Replacement Volume).
62 d. § 24-2-5.
6id. § 24-2-8.
"Id. § 24-2-11.
c1d. § 24-2-12.
C6Id. § 24-3-6. Payment of a special fee or tax, such as this one, to the City of
St. Paul was considered a significant factor in finding state action in Ihrke v.
Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated as moot, 409 U.S.
815 (1972). The court felt that such a payment, based on percentage of gross reve-
nues, made the city a direct beneficiary of the utility's operation and, thus, further
integrated the operation of the utility with that of the "state."
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Even this cursory examination of the regulatory powers of the
Commission reveals that utilities are extensively regulated in West
Virginia. In fact, the West Virginia court has characterized the
power of the Commission as almost unlimited in controlling the
"facilities, charges and services of all public service corpora-
tions . . . .. The regulatory powers of the Commission also are
similar to and compare favorably with the powers of those commis-
sions discussed previously in the state action cases." Thus, the
extent to which utilities are regulated in West Virginia, coupled
with monopoly status, where it exists,6" could allow the courts to
treat West Virginia utilities as state actors.
Neither judicial action nor any further legislative action would
appear necessary to require West Virginia utilities to furnish proce-
dural due process to their customers. The Commission apparently
already has the power to require due process, because if it finds
any regulations, measurements, practices, acts or service to be
unjust, unreasonable, insufficient or unjustly discriminatory
. ..or. . .that any service is inadequate, or that any service
which is demanded cannot be reasonably obtained, [it] shall
determine and declare, and by order fix, reasonable measure-
ments, regulations, acts; practices or service, to be furnished,
imposed, observed and followed in the State. .... 0
This grant of authority is apparently broad enough to allow the
Commission to prescribe due process standards to be followed by
the utilities in West Virginia if it finds that the present practices
are inadequate to serve the needs of the public. Such action by the
Commission would certainly serve its purpose of safeguarding the
interests of the public and would be justified by a finding that
some or all of the abuses shown to exist in other states either exist
in West Virginia or could arise due to the inadequacies of present
procedure. West Virginia, therefore, has the advantage of having
a Public Service Commission which can correct any existing proce-
dural deficiencies and prevent such deficiencies from arising in the
6'United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 103 W. Va. 306, 310, 138 S.E.
388, 390 (1927).
"See supra note 28 for a list of the relevant regulatory powers often considered
by the courts.
"The Commission controls competition and prevents duplication of facilities
by granting certificates of public convenience and necessity. Monopoly status is,
therefore, directly controlled by the State and is a benefit conferred by the State
upon the utility.
"'W. VA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-7 (1971 Replacement Volume).
[Vol. 76
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future. All this can be done without the necessity of costly and
impractical litigation or additional legislative action.
V. CONCLUSION
This note has actually been written in the form of an hypothe-
sis; that is, given that there presently are deficiencies in the proce-
dures of public utilities, such deficiencies should be corrected in
West Virginia administratively, rather than judicially or legisla-
tively. This method has been necessitated by the difficulty of ob-
taining information as to present practices of the utilities. How-
ever, several conclusions can be drawn from the discussion of this
newly emerging area of the law. First, utilities do enjoy a unique
economic position in modern society and their operations are
closely entwined with those of the regulatory commissions in the
various states. Therefore, utilities are not merely private business
enterprises attempting to market products but, rather, are sanc-
tioned monopolies operating under the imprimatur of the state
itself. Second, the services which utilities provide are essential to
modern life. Heat, light, gas, and water are necessities on which
life itself can depend. Finally, society has a strong interest in assur-
ing that these vital services are not wrongfully terminated or other-
wise affected. This interest is so strong that utility customers
should be procedurally protected even if there is not a high incid-
ence of wrongful terminations.
Procedural fairness, so far as is practicable, should be guaran-
teed to all utility customers regardless of whether any abuses pres-
ently exist-if the potential for abuse exists. These additional safe-
guards could be implemented with no cost to the utilities them-
selves and only a nominal cost to consumers. Thus, it is imperative
that the West Virginia Public Service Commission take the initia-
tive in assuring that this necessary service will be furnished to the
public.
Mark A. Summers
16
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 76, Iss. 4 [1974], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol76/iss4/7
